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The following tale, though it may seem something of a cross
between a law school examination and a soap opera, illustrates the
current scope of governmental intrusion into our private lives.
William Budd, a gentle young man of slight worldly experi-
ence, unwittingly became the enemy of Special Agent Javert, faith-
ful minion of Uriah Heep. Whilst awaiting transportation to his
Peace Corps assignment in Laos, William accidentally discovered
heroin secreted in a shipment of tariff forms consigned to Uriah, a
man whose career ambitions soar beyond his post as District Col-
lector of Customs. Javert learned of William's dangerous knowl-
edge when he overheard William telling his Aunt Hester on the
telephone about his find, and Javert took countermeasures. From
Uriah's computer, he immediately obtained a printout of William's
personal history, which revealed some interesting data. William,
better known as Billy, had associated with campus dissidents, sung
ribald songs critical of the administration, occasionally smoked pot,
and twice had been arrested for participating in peace demonstra-
tions. Since college he had not been gainfully employed, but he
had received substantial amounts of cash from an unidentified
source. Javert also retrieved from the computer an intriguing
printout of Hester's history. Hester was highly placed in the
* This Article is based on the Owen I. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
17 October 1978, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of
the Coif, the Law Alumni Society, and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
f United States Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
B.B.A. 1945, University of New Mexico; LL.B. 1949, Stanford University.
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conservative Tory Party, and she was Chairman of the Morals Pro-
tection League. Curiously, her tax returns showed substantial
donations to such suspect organizations as the Abigail Adams
Liberation Front, the Nat Turner Memorial Fund, and the Ben
Franklin Free Press Association. Her file also contained reports by
confidential informants who said that Hester's past was even more
colorful: people in her home town claimed that youthful indis-
cretions had branded her with a reputation for licentiousness.
Armed with this information and his own creative imagination,
javert wrote to the Postmaster and obtained a mail cover,- for all
of Billy's and Hester's mail. He also persuaded an old friend who
was an Internal Revenue Service agent to subpoena Hester's bank
records for the purpose of uncovering possible fraud in claiming
charitable tax deductions. At the same time, Uriah falsely re-
ported to an FBI agent that he had received information from a
reliable tipster that Billy and Hester were members of a conspiracy
to import heroin from Laos. Upon Uriah's representations to the
Justice Department, together with Javert's affidavit reporting con-
versations about narcotics that he said he had overheard between
Billy and Hester and reciting his unsuccessful efforts to infiltrate
their organization, a Strike Force attorney obtained a court order
to tap Hester's and Billy's telephones and to place hidden micro-
phones in Billy's home.
The mail covers permitted preparation of extensive dossiers
identifying Billy's and Hester's friends, relatives, creditors, and banks
and tabbing their associations with religious and political organiza-
tions. The titles of pamphlets, books, and magazines each had re-
ceived in the mail were all recorded. Billy's bank records, includ-
ing his cancelled checks, were retrieved by subpoenas. A correlation
of his checks with some otherwise mysterious references in his
telephone conversations, plus some routine legwork, supplied a
complete picture of Billy's activities for the previous three years.
Although no evidence of any criminal conduct was found, the data
did disclose some meetings with a young woman under compro-
mising circumstances. An anonymous note from Javert to Billy's
fiancee revealing names, dates, and places was enough to end Billy's
engagement.
With the cooperation of the Justice Department, Uriah for-
warded a complete dossier on Billy to the head of the Peace Corps
'A mail cover is a surveillance procedure by which a record is made of all
information appearing on the external cover of any mail addressed to the person un-
der investigation. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of
mail covers, see notes 112-29 infra & accompanying text.
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and informed him that the matter was to be presented before a
federal grand jury. Billy was thereupon asked for his resignation
from the Peace Corps.
Javert produced a heroin sample for the investigators which
he said he found during a routine customs search of mail addressed
to Billy from Laos. In testimony before the grand jury, Javert
described an incriminating conversation he said he overheard be-
tween Billy and a person later identified as Hester, and he revealed
the results of the investigation of Billy's bank records showing sub-
stantial cash payments to Billy which had been traced to Hester.
He also reported Billy's association with political dissident groups
which cast doubt upon his loyalty to the United States. An indict-
ment was returned against Billy for illegally importing heroin.
During pretrial proceedings, Billy was notified that his tele-
phone had been tapped and his home bugged. One of his tape-
recorded conversations contained references to "rolling stones" and
"iron butterflies." In an affidavit accompanying a request for au-
thorization to continue electronic surveillance of Billy, a DEA agent
identified these terms as jargon for various kinds of narcotics. The
court denied Billy's motions to suppress the recordings. The case
never came to trial-the government dismissed the indictment when
its star witness, Javert, disappeared somewhere in France.
In the meantime, Hester learned that she was the target of a
tax investigation and that an indictment against her was imminent.
An employee of the Ben Franklin Free Press Association told her
that the Association's files had been searched pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause to believe that she was using the Associa-
tion as a conduit for illegal political contributions. He also told
her he had heard that federal agents were asking a lot of questions
about her in her old home town. This news, together with the
discovery that her telephones had been tapped, caused Hester to
suffer a nervous collapse, and she withdrew from all public life.
No indictment was ever sought against her.
Does the Constitution shield Billy or Hester from these govern-
mental incursions into their associations, their mail, their telephone
conversations, their homes, and other aspects of their lives? Is any
legal redress available in the federal courts for the injuries they
have suffered? The short answer to both questions is "no." They
are not entitled to notice that their mail is being used to create a
data bank.2 They cannot quash the subpoenas of their bank
239 C.F.R. §233.2(g)(4) (1978). The subject of a mail cover is never
apprised of the surveillance unless it is revealed in discovery proceedings. If the
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records. 3 No property has been seized that they can retrieve. No
evidence has been produced that they can suppress. They are not
entitled to prior knowledge of the wiretaps or the buggings; 4 they
are notified only after the damage has been done.5 They are the
victims of official corruption, of modern technology, of congres-
sional malfunctions, and of judicial decisions that have whittled
away protections of the first, fourth, and fifth amendments.
Zealous efforts of the Supreme Court and of Congress to pro-
tect us both from the fact of crime and the fear of crime have left
law-abiding Americans today with little more protection from
governmental spying, searching, and seizing expeditions than our
colonial forebears had from writs of assistance and general warrants.
Understanding how we got into this fix requires first a brief his-
torical perspective.6
I. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
In 1761, James Otis, Jr. argued against the validity of writs of
assistance in the common pleas court in Boston. John Adams de-
scribed that argument as the electrifying event that "'breathed into
this nation the breath of life. . . . Every man of a crowded
audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms
against writs of assistance . . . . Then and there the child Inde-
pendence was born.' "7
mail cover does not result in litigation, therefore, the subject never learns of it.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972);
United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 350
(1978). See note 122 infra & accompanying text.
3 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
4 18 U.S.C. §2518(3) (1976).
518 U.S.C. §2518(8)(d) (1976); United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,
429 n.19 (1977); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355-56 n.16 (1967). If
the government does not name the person overheard in its application for a wiretap
order, the subject is entitled to notice only in the judge's discretion. Whether post-
interception notice is discretionary or mandatory, however, failure to give it will
not result in suppression of evidence discovered by the tap. United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. at 439; United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977); United States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975)
(notice given two years after termination of wiretap but three months before trial);
United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973).
6 For a detailed treatment of the history of general warrants and writs of as-
sistance and of their relation to the origin of the fourth amendment, see J. LANrN-
sExr, SEAcH AND SmzURE IN THE SuPrtzm CoURT (1966); N. LAssoN, T-. His-
TORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FounTu A MMNENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSnTrruTON (1937); T. TAYLOR, Two STunms IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTmtETA-
TION (1969).
7 LAssoN, supra note 6, at 59. For an account of the legal theories regarding
the validity of writs of assistance and the outcome of the case, see id. 59-65.
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Writs of assistance began their legislative life in England in
1662.8 They were tax collection devices issued under the seal of
the English Court of Exchequer, commanding all officers and
subjects of the Crown to assist in their execution. Under such
writs, any person in the company of a civil officer could search any
house, shop, warehouse, or other facility to find and remove un-
customed goods. If resistance was offered, the searchers could break
down the doors and open any chests or packages in seeking untaxed
goods. Probable cause was not required to support issuance of the
writs, and they were valid for the entire lifetime of the reigning
sovereign. The writs were not returnable at all after execution.
The only limitations were that the objects of the search were sup-
posed to be uncustomed merchandise, the writs could not be used as
warrants of arrest, they could not be executed in the nighttime to
search any land structure, and a civil officer had to be present during
their execution.9
Tax collectors have always been unpopular, but the colonial
hatred for writs of assistance was based on concerns much more
profound than those that motivated California taxpayers to support
Proposition 13. The odious features of writs of assistance were
the unbridled discretion given public officials to choose targets of
the searches, the arbitrary invasion of homes and offices to execute
the writs, and the inability to prevent the searches, to recover the
objects seized, or to receive recompense for injuries suffered from
the intrusion.'0
The founders' distaste for writs of assistance was matched by
their hatred for general warrants. General warrants were used to
discover evidence of disloyalty or opposition to the Crown. Like
writs of assistance, they were creatures of the Executive. They gave
agents of the Crown unlimited discretion in choosing the persons
to be searched, the things to be seized, and the means to be used in
accomplishing both aims."
8 Writs of assistance, so called because they required all officers and subjects
of the Crown to assist those executing the writ, were a form of general warrant for
the search and seizure of smuggled goods. They were first used during the reign
of James I, although the first parliamentary authorization for writs of assistance
came in 1662. While such writs were seldom used in England, they were issued
frequently in the colonies. See authorities cited in note 6 supra.
9 See L&ssoN, supra note 6, at 53-55.
10 See LANDYNSKr, supra note 6, at 40 (Patrick Henry's views); LAssoN, supra
note 6, at 59-60 (James Otis's argument in the Writs of Assistance Cases), 75
(petition of the Continental Congress to George IJI in 1774).
11 General warrants customarily authorized the King's messengers to arrest any
person suspected of responsibility for the publication of offensive papers and to
seize all of their books and papers from any suspected premises. Lasson cites a
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Crowns have often made uneasy headrests; in 1538, royal in-
somnia reached such proportions as to require enactment of the
first of the infamous ordinances requiring licensing of books and
restricting printing and publication.12 These measures proved in-
adequate to kill the underground press or to quell the mounting
opposition to the government. The Court of Star Chamber and
the Privy Council accordingly imposed more and more stringent
penalties upon persons suspected of subversion and increasingly
authorized searches and seizures of anyone or anything that might
disturb the Crown's sense of security. The barest suspicion that a
person harbored ill thoughts against the government was enough
to bring the oppressive force of a general warrant upon him.13
The immediate object of a general warrant was the discovery
of tangible things-books, documents, and private writings-that
could be used as evidence against the author, printer, or publisher.
But the ultimate aim was to discover and to suppress intangibles-
ideas-those dangerous essences of the human mind. No person
in the realm was immune from general warrants borne by the mes-
sengers of nervous sovereigns. 14
The abuses of general warrants led to a series of lawsuits which
rank among the most famous cases in English jurisprudence. One of
number of egregious examples of the limitless discretion granted to the messengers,
including a Privy Council order to search for "'all manner of letters and papers that
may concern the State' and another "'to make searche for all letters, bookes or
writings whatsoever that may concern in your judgmentes matter that hath been or
may be intended to be moved in Parliament, and especially suche notes, collections,
books or papers as containe matter touching the establishment of the Crowne of
England."' LAssoN, supra note 6, at 26 n.50 (quoting AcTs OF HE Pxuv
CouNcm 291, 392 (J. Dasent ed. 1895) [hereinafter cited as Dasent]). Regarding
the means permitted, Lasson quotes from a warrant issued in 1593 by the Court of
Star Chamber authorizing the arrest, search, and torture of the suspects "'to be
used at such times and as often as you see fit."' LASSON, supra note 6, at 27
(quoting C. TucxEa-BnooE, WonKs AND LFE OF CmusToPsmzsn MArLowE (1930)).
12 See LAssoN, supra note 6, at 24.
13 To cite one example, a Privy Council warrant was issued in 1596 for
the apprehension of a certain printer, upon information "which maye
touche" his allegiance, with authority to search for and seize "all bookes,
papers, writinges, and other things whatsoever that you shall find in his
house to be kept unlawfully and offensively, that the same maie serve to
discover the offense wherewith he is charged."
Id. 26, 27 (quoting Dasent, supra note 11, at 425).
14 The arrest of John Wilkes, then a member of Parliament, and the seizure of
his books and papers under a general warrant provided the occasion for one of the
most celebrated cases in the law of search and seizure. Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). See Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1692, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050
(1765); Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). Issuance
of general warrants against members of Parliament was not unusual. See LAssoN,
supra note 6, at 31-32.
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them, Entick v. Carrington,:5 became a cornerstone of American
constitutional law. In 1762 Lord Halifax, Secretary of State, issued
a warrant which was specific regarding the person to be searched,
John Entick, but general in terms of the papers to be sought. En-
tick's home was ransacked pursuant to this warrant and his private
papers taken. Entick brought an action against the searchers and
won a great victory, not only for himself, but also for the cause of
freedom. In his classic opinion, Lord Camden observed that it was
intolerable that a person's "house is rifled" and "his most valuable
secrets are taken out of his possession, before the paper, for which he
is charged, is found to be criminal by any competent jurisdiction,
and before he is convicted either of writing, publishing, or being
concerned in the paper." 16 Defense counsel argued that the warrant
should be upheld because it served as "a means of detecting offenders
by discovering evidence." 17 Lord Camden rejected the argument,
stating that even in crimes "more atrocious than libeling," the law
"provided no paper-search ... to help forward the conviction." 1s
He added:
"It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to ac-
cuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling
self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; ... [a] search for
evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too
the innocent would be confounded with the guilty." 19
II. TiH EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
From the carefully documented history of the adoption of the
fourth amendment,20 we know that the draftsmen were well aware
of the travails and triumphs of Entick and the ordeals suffered under
the tyrannical reign of the Privy Council and the Court of Star
Chamber. The amendment was also rooted in the colonial experi-
ence with arbitrary governmental action, which had surfaced not
only in rummaging searches by customs officers, but also in other
deprivations of freedom.
15 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). A shorter version- is reported at 2 Wils.
K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
16 Id. 1064.
37 Id. 1073.
18 Id.
19Id., quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,.629 (1886).
20 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 6 supra.
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The founding fathers had never heard the phrase "the right to
be let alone," 21 and they could not anticipate the invention of
telephones, computers, data banks, or any of the electronic miracles
of potential mischief surrounding us. They were, however, fully
sensitive to the dangers to a free people caused not only by clumsy
execution of writs and warrants, but also by the chilling knowledge
of the existence of unbridled official power to break and enter, to
spy, to probe, and to seize papers and personal effects.22 They valued
property, but they also valued intangibles. The men who sought
to assure us an inalienable right to pursue happiness could not pos-
sibly have been oblivious to the needs of the human spirit.
History can never reveal the founding fathers' thoughts about
electronic surveillance, but history does warn us of the dangers of
oppression and the fragility of freedom when the dominant mem-
bers of society, rightly or wrongly, believe themselves threatened.
The language of the fourth amendment is both familiar and
elusive. The warrant clause assures us that warrants will not issue
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. "Probable cause" is nevertheless a highly elastic con-
cept. Even more elasticity is supplied by the reasonableness clause.
History can illuminate some aspects of the draftsmen's intent
in writing these glorious ambiguities, but history alone cannot teach
us how to make the fourth amendment a living force in a constantly
changing world. The vitalizing principle must always be the effort
to adapt those constitutional concepts to the ever-changing demands
of a complex, pluralistic society.
Until the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court was
called upon only rarely to interpret the fourth amendment.2 3 The
sparsity of decisions is not at all surprising. Police activities were
conducted almost entirely by state and local police, and the fourth
amendment was not applied to such state action until 1949.24
Federal law enforcement officers formed a tiny band; they were
primarily customs and revenue agents. Many decades were to pass
2 1 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HArv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
22 See Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right
to Privacy, 26 REcoRD A.B. Crn= N.Y. 546 (1971).
23 The Supreme Court dealt with the fourth amendment in only five cases prior
to the October term of 1885: Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119 (1866); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 76 (1855); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 67 (1849).
24 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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before their number would be swelled by thousands. Moreover,
remedies for fourth amendment violations had yet to be developed.
That picture changed in 1886 when the Supreme Court decided
Boyd v. United States.2 The Court held that compelled produc-
tion of incriminating documentary evidence was a violation of the
fourth amendment, that introduction of the evidence in a criminal
proceeding was a violation of the fifth amendment, and that evi-
dence unconstitutionally obtained was inadmissible at trial. Al-
though Boyd was a great constitutional case, its factual setting
was ordinary. The government instituted a forfeiture proceeding
against the defendants for importing merchandise in violation of the
revenue laws. Under a customs statute, the government obtained
a court order requiring the defendants to produce a business in-
voice for previously imported merchandise. The statute required
the defendants either to produce the invoice or to confess the
charge against them.
2 6
The Court held unanimously that the statute was an unconsti-
tutional violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The
document was produced by compulsion, and its use at a quasi-
criminal trial made the subject of the court order a witness against
himself.27 The Court divided, however, on the fourth amendment
point. The concurring Justices did not believe that the order for
production authorized any unreasonable search or seizure of the
defendants' "house, papers, or effects." 28 Mr. Justice Bradley,
speaking for a majority of the Court, held that the compulsory pro-
duction of the defendants' private papers was a search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment even though the
government did not physically intrude in any way onto the de-
fendants' premises.
29
In supporting his expansive reading of the fourth and fifth
amendments, Mr. Justice Bradley recited the history that preceded
adoption of the fourth amendment, relying heavily on Lord Cam-
den's opinion in Entick v. Carrington.3" His eloquent exposition
of the fourth and fifth amendments became one of the most fre-
25116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26 Id. 619-20.
27 Id. 634-35.
28 Id. 638-41.
29 Id. 634-35.
30 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
626-31 (1886).
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quently quoted and least often followed judicial opinions in Ameri-
can constitutional history.31 He said:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security.... It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property .... Breaking into
a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances
of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion
of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his
goods, is within the condemnation of... [Lord Camden's]
judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other.32
Mr. Justice Bradley justified his conclusions with a lesson in
constitutional interpretation:
A close and literal construction deprives . . . [constitu-
tional provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound
than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.
33
3' For example, Mr. Justice Bradley's ringing words in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886), were quoted by the majority opinions in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (federal habeas corpus relief not available for claim
that evidence obtained in unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
trial); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471 (1976) (introduction of business
records seized in search of office did not violate fifth amendment); Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
does not prohibit subpoena of business records of dissolved partnership from former
partner; although the issue in Boyd itself was a notice to produce a partnership
business record, the Bellis Court concluded that its predecessors in Boyd had not
fully understood the significance of that decision and had treated the invoice at
issue there as a private business record, id. 95 n.2); United States v. Dionisio, 410
U.S. 1, 7 n.6 (1973) (compelled production of voice exemplars constitutional);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330 (1973) (compelled production of busi-
ness records from accountant not barred by fifth amendment); Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971) (home visitation prerequisite for' welfare eligibility did
not violate fourth amendment); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967)
("mere evidence" rule overturned); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 205 n.33 (1946) (subpoena for production of corporate records does
not violate fourth or fifth amendment); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487,
490 (1944) (fifth amendment does not forbid use in federal court of self-incrimi-
nating testimony compelled in state court).
82 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
38 Id. 635.
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III. THE LrrERALIST APPROACH-PRoPERTY CONCEPTS
The warning became a prophecy. Although it took almost a
hundred years to destroy Mr. Justice Bradley's constitutional edifice,
narrow and literal readings of the language of both amendments
began the erosion decades earlier. No encroachments on the rights
which the Court sought to preserve for our citizens in Boyd v.
United States34 have been more stealthy than those thrust upon us
by the government's invisible searches for intangible things.
A striking illustration of the Supreme Court's recurring at-
tacks of literalism is Olmstead v. United States,35 decided in 1928.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, held that tele-
phone tapping violated neither the fourth nor the fifth amendments.
A telephone tap could be neither a "search" nor a "seizure" be-
cause an eye or an ear could not trespass.3 6 The fourth amend-
ment's reference to "houses, papers, and effects" could not justifiably
be enlarged to include telephone wires because those "wires are
not part of his house or office anymore than are the highways along
which they are stretched." 87 Moreover, the warrant clause was
not applicable to intangible things. No fifth amendment issues
were involved because the tappees were not compelled by the tap
to talk over their telephones: they simply were voluntarily trans-
acting their business without knowledge of the interception.88
Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Butler, and Stone dissented. Mr.
Justice Holmes wanted the courts to play no role "in such dirty
business," and he thought it "a less evil that some criminal should
escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part." 3 9
Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion echoed both the words and the spirit
of Mr. Justice Bradley. He firmly eschewed the crabbed interpre-
tation of the majority, and, in resonant prose, he described the
fourth and fifth amendments' protections of humanistic values
and intangible things:
The makers of our Constitution . . . recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
34116 U.S. 616 (1886).
85277 U.S. 438 (1928).
36 Id. 464.
87 Id. 465.
88 Id. 462..
39 Id. 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every un-
justifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the
use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascer-
tained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the
Fifth.
40
Mr. Chief Justice Taft's reasoning in Olmstead had many at-
tractions. Confining the fourth amendment to tangibles made its
construction and application far easier, especially for judges who
were trained to think in common law property concepts. The rev-
erence for property ownership, of course, must be understood in
terms of a far older tradition in Western culture in which property
ownership was virtually synonymous with membership in the dom-
inant class. Property defined all kinds of social relationships and
hierarchies of power. A manor house, for example, was not simply a
financial asset, but an enclave of privilege and protection for the
owner and all the other inhabitants whom he brought within the
curtilage. Trespassory concepts were thus an adequate although
imperfect way to give the dominant members of society security for
themselves, their houses, papers, and effects. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
did not foresee that intangible assets and intangible values would
soon become as crucial to the rich as the land which the law so
zealously protected. A man whose assets consisted of one hundred
thousand shares of blue chip securities would find no shelter from
prying eyes or eavesdropping ears by standing behind his computer
printouts. Focusing on tangibles kept the Court on familiar terrain
and at the same time avoided the distressing necessity of recognizing
and ordering intangible interests on the uncertain scales of reason-
ableness.
Property concepts aside, however, the result was irresistible to
those who disliked the exclusionary rule, quietly adopted in Boyd
and firmly declared in 1914 in Weeks v. United States.41 For decades
after Olmstead, judges and lawyers focused on trespass and explored
the subtler points of ownership, custody, and control of real and
personal property.42 Interest in these fine distinctions was surely
40 Id. 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4 2 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (inserting "spike
mike" halfway through party wall was unreasonable search; distinguishing Goldman
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enhanced by recognition of their usefulness in preventing the wicked
from finding protection in the fourth and fifth amendments. In-
nocent victims of improper searches which yielded nothing did not
appear in the legal process.
IV. ABANDONING THE TREsPAss DOCTRINE
Dissatisfactions with Olmstead v. United States43 arose re-
peatedly as scholars and judges recognized that the mechanical
approach was hopelessly simplistic in coping with the real world
of developing technology.44 As Mr. Justice Brandeis predicted in
Olmstead, "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading pri-
vacy have become available to the Government." 45 One such
method was to equip a government undercover agent with broadcast-
ing or recording equipment to transmit or capture conversations
with a suspect in his home or office. In Lopez v. United States46
and On Lee v. United States,47 the Court held that, as long as the
government agent obtained admission to the home or office by
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), in which microphone was merely attached
to surface of opposite side of wall); Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913)
(no fifth amendment privilege against use of papers which defendant no longer
owned because of transfer in title during bankruptcy proceedings).
"Guests" and "invitees" were not permitted to object to searches of premises,
e.g., Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955); In re Nassetta,
125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942), although a "lessee or licensee," United States v.
De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902 (D. Mass. 1929), or a person with "dominion" had standing,
Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1952); McMillan v. United
States, 26 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1928). Trespassers did not have standing, but
tenants by sufferance did. Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931).
Employees, who though in "control" or "occupancy" lacked "possession," could not
object to a search of business premises. United States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811
(2d Cir. 1933); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932). In fact,
an employee could not object to the search of his own desk. United States v.
Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1945). An officer, manager, or custodian of cor-
porate records could not object to their seizure, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911), even if he was the sole shareholder of the corporation and the papers
would have been protected had he not incorporated, Lagow v. United States, 159
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946).
Perhaps the most finely drawn distinction denied fourth amendment protection
to the owner of a car, when the car was in the possession of a bailee for hire, a
garage near defendant's hotel, and the defendant did not claim ownership of the
unlicensed radio equipment seized from the car. Casey v. United States, 191 F.2d
I (9th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 808 (1952).
43 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
44 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing; Holmes, J., dissenting); S. DAsH, R. KNOwLTON, & B. ScHWv.iTz, TEE EAVEs-
DmopmEs (1959); Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense
Counsel's View, 44 Mn'N. L. R1v. 855 (1960).
45 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
46373 U.S. 427 (1963).
47343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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guile and deception and not by breaking or entering or any kind
of technical trespass, warrantless electronic eavesdropping did not
violate the fourth amendment. Justices Burton and Frankfurter, dis-
senting in On Lee, abjured the trespass rationale, and forthrightly
expressed their view that the "Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to the
seizure of tangible things. It extends to intangibles, such as spoken
words." 48
Restlessness with Olmstead was even more pronounced in 1961
when the Court decided Silverman v. United States.49 Although
the majority opinion nominally turned on trespass because the spike
mike in that case had penetrated a part of Silverman's home, the
Court also hinted that fourth amendment rights were not "inevitably
measurable in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property
law." 50
The trespass doctrine was finally abandoned in 1967 in Katz v.
United States,'1 and Olmstead's fourth amendment holding was
expressly overruled. Katz established a new formula of fourth
amendment protection: "Wherever an individual may harbor a
'reasonable expectation of privacy,'.., he is entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion." 52 Katz held inadmissible
48 d. 765 (Burton, J., dissenting).
49 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
5o Id. 511.
51389 U.S. 347 (1967).
52 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion
for the majority in Katz did not use the words "reasonable expectation of privacy,"
but said, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected." Id. 351-52. Mr. Justice Harlan's quotable phrase has come to
be accepted as "the Katz test," although it is more restrictive than the approach of
the majority and has been persuasively criticized. E.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MImN. L. REv. 349 (1974). See TAYhoR, supra note 6,
at 110-14; Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property Con-
cepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1971);
Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or,
A Mars Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. Rzv. 63 (1974); Note, The Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. Rzv. 468
(1976); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MicH.
L. REv. 154 (1977); Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz
Study of Fourth Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968 (1968); Note,
Types of Property Seizable Under the Fourth Amendment, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 963
(1976).
"Privacy" is itself an elusive concept. The Court has often used the term to
refer to a right of personal autonomy in making certain kinds of important decisions
free from governmental regulation. E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Fried, Privacy, 77 YAI.E L.J. 475 (1968); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74
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incriminating evidence obtained without a warrant by fixing a bug
to the outside of a public telephone booth. Th6 Court was explicit
that a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment is not
limited to physical intrusions to search for tangible things. Instead,
a "search" is anything that invades the interests protected by the
amendment. 3 The concept of "seizure" was also broadened accord-
ing to the specifications of the majority in Boyd to include recording
of oral statements.5
Let us leave the ghost of Mr. Justice Bradley enjoying a toast
to privacy with Mr. Justice Brandeis's shade. Other developments
will make their festivities brief. We turn to another part of the
fourth amendment forest to observe the life cycle of the mere evi-
dence rule.
V. TiH MERE EVIDENCME DocmNra
Both in England and in the colonies before adoption of the
Constitution, searches for evidence of crime were primarily under-
taken by ordinary citizens who either caught a felon red-handed or
followed him in hot pursuit, occasionally assisted by a local con-
stable 5   Organized police forces did not exist. Judicially au-
COLum. L. REv. 1410 (1974); Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary
and Intimate Decision, 64 CALw. L. REv. 1447 (1976). Commentators who have
attempted to define "privacy" in the fourth amendment sense have most often spoken
of the ability to control disclosure of information about oneself. E.g., A. WEsmNr,
PrVAcy AND Fnxnom 7 (1967) ('Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others."); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification
of Concepts, 72 CoLmm. L. REv. 693, 709 (1972) ('Privacy is the condition enjoyed
by one who can control the communication of information about himself."); Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 21, at 198 ("The common law secures to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions shall be communicated to others."). See Beaney, The Right to Privacy and
American Law, 31 LAw & Co~zvw. TNoB. 253 (1966); Miller, Personal Privacy in
the Computer Age, 67 MicH. L. IR-v. 1089 (1969). The fourth amendment is not,
however, only a constitutional limitation on the government's accumulation or dis-
closure of information about its citizens. It also defines the relationship between
government and individual, limiting the government's power to intrude arbitrarily
into people's lives. The fourth amendment protects not only a right of nondisclosure,
but, in a more fundamental sense, the "right to be let alone," Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 21, at 193, by imposing "the maximum restrictions upon the power of
organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of
organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See generally Amsterdam, supra.
53 "[T]he Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public
upon personal security...." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1968). See
Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J.
1461, 1479 (1977) ("Katz stands for the proposition that.., an invasion of Fourth
Amendment rights . . . occurs whenever the functional effect of the government's
investigation is to gain access to matters otherwise protected.").
54 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See text accompanying note 29 supra.
55 See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 28, 39.
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thorized warrants to enforce criminal law were extremely limited."6
They were used generally to arrest a felon and to search for stolen
goods or other fruits of his crime, weapons used in the crime, and
clothes or other identifying objects. Although general warrants is-
sued by the executive branch of government were used to seize
private papers and personal effects, judicial warrants were not issued
for that purpose. Indeed, in Entick v. Carrington, Lord Camden
denied that magistrates had the power to authorize the seizure of
private papers.
57
Although nothing in the English or colonial experience gave
the draftsmen of the fourth amendment any reason for concern
about judicially authorized seizure of private papers, they were
extremely anxious to protect the citizenry from the indignities of
general warrants which, among other things, were specifically aimed
at discovering suspicious or incriminating private documents. The
Court in Boyd v. United States, s relying both upon that history and
upon Lord Camden's analysis in Entick, concluded that private
papers were beyond the reach of judicially authorized process even
when the document involved was a business document as impersonal
as an invoice.59
From Boyd arose the constitutional doctrine that "mere evi-
dence" was not a legitimate object of a governmental search and
seizure. The doctrine was made even more explicit thirty-five years
later in Gouled v. United States. ° Until the Espionage Act of
1917,1 Congress had not authorized the issuance of federal search
warrants for property. In Gouled, a search warrant had been is-
sued under the 1917 statute to seize papers which were then intro-
66 See id. 44-46.
57 Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspec-
tion; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a
trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret
nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand
more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written law that
gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none ....
There is no process against papers in civil causes.... In the criminal
law ... there are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery,
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and peijury, that are more
atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in these
cases to help forward the conviction.
19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066, 1073 (1765).
58 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
59 Id. 627-32.
60 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
61 Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 228.
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duced as evidence against the owner in a trial for conspiracy to
defraud the government. The Supreme Court unanimously held
that the warrant violated both the fourth and fifth amendments.
Because the government wanted Gouled's papers "only to use ...
as evidence" 62 against him, the search warrant violated the fourth
amendment, and the use of the papers at trial violated his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Under the reign
of Gouled, the mere evidence limitation on the scope of search
warrants became an integral part of both the fourth and fifth
amendments.
The mere evidence rule was, however, too encompassing and
too uncertainly moored to retain indefinite adherence. It forbade
seizure of all kinds of evidence and thus had little or no relationship
to the privacy notions that had given the rule birth.6 3 Moreover,
it made neither constitutional nor common sense that mere evi-
dence seized with a warrant was inadmissible, but evidence of con-
versations captured by wiretapping or surreptitious electronic
recording could be admitted without any warrant at all. The
whole purpose of wiretapping and electronic surveillance was to
gather evidence to be used against the speaker. The rule soon
sprouted a bewildering variety of exceptions, many of which were
framed in technical property concepts. 64
62 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921).
63 See, e.g., Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (articles of clothing used to identify defendant); Morrison v. United
States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (handkerchief bearing tangible evidence of
homosexual act); United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951)
(identification bracelet and documents connecting defendant with crime of harboring
a fugitive). Telford Taylor suggested that privacy interests would be better pro-
tected by permitting searches for evidence but creating an exception for testimonial
documents ("operational" documents would be seizable). TAYLOR, supra note 6,
at 63-71.
64 "Seizable property" consisted of contraband and fruits and instrumentalities
of crime, a definition traditionally explained by the sovereign's superior property
interest in these categories of items. A thief had no interest in stolen goods, the
fruits of crime, and the sovereign had a superior claim of title to contraband, whose
very possession was illegal. An instrumentality of crime was deodand and subject
to immediate forfeiture. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24
(1886); United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926). See also
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967).
Courts were inventive in finding that items of evidentiary value were also fruits
or instrumentalities of crime. E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)
(forged birth certificate was means of committing espionage); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (forged draft cards were means of violating Selective
Service Act); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (cancelled check used to
defraud the government); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927)
(business ledger and utility bills part of "outfit or equipment" used in operating
illegal bar); United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958) (shoes worn by
bank robber were instrument of crime because necessary to escape); United States
v. Pardo-Bolland, 229 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (passport, airline tickets, foreign
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The mere evidence ruled died in 1967 when the Court decided
Warden v. Hayden.65 As is so often true, the factual setting of the
case gave little inkling of the far-reaching consequences that would
follow the destruction of the mere evidence rule. Police were in
hot pursuit of a robber whose clothing had been described by an
eyewitness. The robber disappeared into a house, and the police
followed in order to arrest him. While searching the house for the
robber, the police found a jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing
man was said to have worn. The court of appeals reversed Hay-
den's conviction on the ground that the clothing should have been
excluded from evidence under the mere evidence rule. The
Supreme Court, however, upheld Hayden's conviction and over-
ruled Gouled. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion,
recognized that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is
the protection of privacy rather than property," 66 but he did not
foresee the extent to which abandonment, rather than modification,
of the mere evidence rule would dismantle protection of privacy.
He assumed that the fourth amendment would safeguard "items of
evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the
object of a reasonable search and seizure," 67 and he also assumed
that the fifth amendment, as explicated in Schmerber v. California,6 8
would prevent seizure of testimonial or communicative evidence.69
With those assumptions, Mr. Justice Brennan not surprisingly also
believed that the warrant requirement would adequately protect
persons from unreasonable governmental incursions upon privacy.
currency, and checkbooks were instrumentalities of narcotics offense); People v.
Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965) (medical records
instrumentalities of fraudulent billings). See Comment, Limitations on Seizure of
"Evidentiary" Objects-A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 319
(1953); Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J. 593
(1966).
For a discussion of the narrowing of the mere evidence rule, see Note, The
Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MicH. L. BEv. 184, 190-95
(1977).
65387 U.S. 294 (1967).
66 Id. 304.
67 Id. 303.
68384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
69Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1967). See McKenna, The
Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of a Hierarchical Fourth
Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55 (1977-78); Comment, Protection of the Right of Privacy
in One's Personal Papers, 1970 LAw & Soc. ORDER 269; Comment, The Search
and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations,
6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 274 (1973); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitu-
tionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L.
Rmv. 945 (1977); Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976),
76 MicH. L. REv. 184, 200 (1977); Note, Papers, Privacy and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments: A Constitutional Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 626 (1974).
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He did not foresee that both assumptions would soon prove in-
valid, nor did he anticipate the extent to which the demise of the
mere evidence rule would affect not only the kinds of things sub-
ject to seizure, but also the persons and places subject to govern-
mental invasions, with or without a search warrant. The lone
dissenter, Mr. Justice Douglas, balefully warned: "the practice of
rummaging through one's personal effects could destroy freedom....
[T]he choice of opening . . . [one's] private effects . . . to the
police or keeping their contents a secret and their integrity inviolate
. . . is the very essence of the right of privacy" that the fourth
and fifth amendments were intended to protect.70
VI. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TODAY
Although the Supreme Court after Warden v. Hayden 7 has
continued to suggest that a core of tangible or intangible things
may exist "whose very nature precludes them from being the ob-
ject of a reasonable search and seizure," 72 the majority of the Court
has thus far failed to find any of them. With constitutional im-
punity, investigating officers armed with a warrant, a summons, a
subpoena, or acting "reasonably" without a warrant or other judi-
cial process, can seize one's conversations,7" checks,74 bank records, 75
papers consigned to one's accountant or lawyer,76 the contents 77
and even the substance of one's body.
78
7 0 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 324, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71387 U.S. 294 (1967).
72 Id. 303. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 n.9 (1976).
7 3 E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961).
74 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
75 Id. 437.
76Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1975) (attorney); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (accountant).
7 7 Although the Supreme Court has held that the use of evidence obtained by
forcibly pumping defendant's stomach violates the due process clause, Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), stomach pumping has withstood fourth amendment
challenge in some courts of appeals. United States v. Owens, 475 F.2d 759, 760
(5th Cir. 1973) (police "acted in good faith to prevent further harm" to hpparently
semi-conscious suspect); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875-76 (9th Cir.
1966) (Rochin distinguished because officers there used excessive force, rather than
merely "necessary" force). Rectal and genital cavities may be searched and the
contents seized, e.g., United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978); Daugh-
tery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973); Henderson v. United States, 390
F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967). Even surgical removal of evidence from a person's body
has been permitted. United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
76 Scbmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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The expectation that the effect of the destruction of the mere
evidence rule would be softened by the privilege against self-
incrimination has also been dashed. The holding that compulsion
within the meaning of the fifth amendment is supplied by the force
of a search warrant, a subpoena, or a court order to produce has
been overruled. The link between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments established by Boyd v. United States, 79 Gouled v.. United
States,80 and Schmerber v. California 81 was severed by the Supreme
Court in Andresen v. Maryland82 and Fisher v. United States. 3
Indeed, the Court in both cases suggested that testimonial compul-
sion in the fifth amendment sense exists only when the government
forces the person to utter incriminating words.8 4  If the Supreme
Court adopts the full reach of the implications of Fisher, the fifth
amendment provides no protection at all to a person who has rashly
committed to his diary observations or thoughts which a govern-
ment official may later decide might be incriminating.
Nevertheless, does not the reasonableness clause or the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment create a barrier against govern-
mental rummaging into our homes and lives, especially when Katz
v. United States 85 has assured us that we have zones of privacy
which cannot be entered? Has not the Supreme Court also prom-
ised us that "a judicial officer, not ... a policeman or government
enforcement agent" decides "[w]hen the right of privacy must rea-
sonably yield to the right of search," 86 and, while exceptions to the
warrant requirement do exist, "those exceptions are few in number
79116 U.S. 616 (1886).
80 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
81384 U.S. 757 (1966).
82 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (seizure of incriminating business records not violative
of fourth or fifth amendment).
83425 U.S. 391 (1976) (IRS summonses directing attorneys to produce tax
records incriminating their clients not violative of fifth amendment).
84 [T]he preparation .of all of the papers sought in these cases was wholly
voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled testimonial evi-
dence . . . . [Ulnless the Government has compelled the subpoenaed
person to write the document, . . . the fact that it was written by him is
not controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue.
Id. 409-10, 410 n.11. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976);
Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Defi-
nition, 61 MIN. L. Biv. 383 (1977); authorities cited in note 69 supra. More-
over, the government can, without offending the fifth amendment, compel the making
of certain records for the express purpose of data banking. Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977).
85389 U.S. 347 (1967).
86 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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and carefully delineated?" 87 These guarantees are extremely com-
forting until one examines the fine print, which makes clear that
the exclusions from coverage vastly exceed the protections which
we .and our forebears who drafted the fourth amendment thought
we had bought and paid for. I do not for a moment suggest that
these promises were not made in good faith. The encroachments
came, as Mr. Justice Bradley predicted,88 by gradual depreciation
of the rights secured by the fourth amendment."9 It is fair to say,
I believe, that the majority of the Court, deciding one case at a
time, did not fully appreciate the synergistic effect of the erasure
of the mere evidence rule, the diminution of the warrant require-
ment, the impact of third-party searches, the redrafting of the
privacy zones, the shrinkage of the fifth amendment, and the onrush
of technology.90
A. Bank and Government Records
To illustrate what has happened, let us recall the troubles of
Hester and Billy. The government obtained a mine of information
87 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
88 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
89 Erosion of fourth and fifth amendment privacy protections has prompted
courts and commentators to resort to the guarantees of the ninth amendment and
state constitutions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); State v.
Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alas. 1978) (electronic monitoring of wired informant violates
state constitutional right of privacy); State v. Brackman, 582 P.2d 1216 (Mont.
1978) (same); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975)
(same); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975)
(police officers posing as students and recording discussions in university classes
violated students' state constitutional right of privacy); Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Hnv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Clark, The
Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Privacy, 5 U. ToL. L. REV. 83 (1973);
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
90 The Court has continued to constrict the zone of fourth amendment protec-
tion by imposing stricter "standing" requirements. In Rakas v. United States, 99
S. Ct. 421 (1978), the Court abandoned the rule of Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 267 (1960), that anyone "legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of
a search has standing to raise the fourth amendment issue. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the majority places property relationships on a high fourth amendment
plane. Despite disclaimers by both Mr. Justice Rehnquist, id. 431 n.12, 434 n.17,
and by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, id. 434, it is difficult to allay
the dissenters' fear that the majority has resurrected Mr. Chief Justice Taft's reason-
ing in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1938). Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct.
421, 440 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
Nevertheless, the Court has, so far, stood firm in preserving significant protec-
tions of the home from warrantless intrusions. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978) (state's "murder scene" exception to warrant requirement unconstitutional);
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (warrant required for entry to investigate
cause of fire). One's home does not begin, however, until the dweller steps beyond
the doorway. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
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from subpoenas of their bank records. Mr. Justice Powell, speaking
for the Court in United States v. Miller,91 explained why Billy and
Hester have no fourth amendment protection from their bankers'
releasing, either voluntarily or involuntarily, their bank records
and copies of their personal checks. First, all bank records, includ-
ing microfilmed checks, are the property of the bank, whose cus-
tomers have no standing to complain about what the bank does
with its own property.9 2 Second, like the narcotics dealers in On
Lee v. United States 93 and United States v. White,9 bank cus-
tomers volunteer this information to the bank and its employees.
To be sure, these customers may believe that the information will
be used only to conduct banking transactions, but they must as-
sume the risk that information given for one purpose will be used
for another. 5 Finally, no one can have an expectation of privacy
in banking affairs, because Congress has made banks reporting
agents for the government. Congress took this step because bank
records "have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and
regulatory investigations and proceedings." 9
The Miller reasoning is disturbing. Reliance upon property
concepts is a retreat from Katz v. United States97 and a reversion to
Olmstead v. United States.98 More troublesome, however, the
property analysis is based on an assumption that the interest sought
to be protected is tangible property; in fact, the interest to be pro-
tected is intangible, namely, all the biographical information that
can be gleaned from examination of the documents. At least so
far, neither the bank nor the government has a property interest in
the details of our personal lives. Of course, it is an outright legal
fiction that a person who uses a bank voluntarily reveals to the
91425 U.S. 435 (1976).
92 Id. 440-41.
93 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
94401 U.S. 745 (1971).
95 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Court had held
previously, in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), that the
maintenance of these bank records did not invade fourth amendment rights of the
depositors.
96 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§1829b(a)(1) (1976)). Cf. 31 U.S.C. §1051 (1976) (similar congressional
purpose of requiring reports to aid in criminal investigations relating to currency
and foreign transactions). The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§§3401-3422 (Supp. 1979), was enacted as a congressional response to Miller.
[1978] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. NEws 9273, 9306. The Act is, however, too
recently enacted to know its actual impact.
97389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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public or to the government all information that can be obtained
from checks and other bank documents. 99
Especially unsettling is the Miller Court's use of the. White and
On Lee rationale that the betrayal of confidence is a risk we must
assume:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amend- "
ment does not prohibit the obtaining of information re-
vealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Govern-
ment authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed. 00
If Billy and Hester must assume that their banks will report con-
fidential information to the government, must they not also assume
that the information they have voluntarily or involuntarily dis-
closed to one department of government, with a promise of con-
fidentiality, will be betrayed by the government itself?101 Has
trust in one's government become constitutionally irrelevant?
Misuse even of data visibly collected should cause us grave
concern. Although no comprehensive statistics exist to tell us how
99 Even more important than original recording of "public" activities is
what is done with the information recorded. . . . If this information is
systematically stored, . . . it is "obtained" in a much more permanent
sense and obtained in a way that may bother a person who bad no objec-
tion to its being known in the trivial sense. Moreover, if pieces of similar
information . . . are systematically stored and collated, "new" information
may be obtained ... that would be unavailable to any of the people who
have learned only one or a few of the pieces of information.
K. GREENAWALT, LEGAL PROTECTONs OF PrvAcy 39 (1975) (final report to the
Office of Telecommunications Policy, Executive Office of the President).
100 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citations omitted). The
analogy of the false friend who turns out to be an informer is inapplicable to the
case of the friend forced by the government to reveal information given in confi-
dence. In the latter case, it is the government, not the friend, who has betrayed
a trust The government's role is even more ignoble when the breach of trust, and
indeed the compilation of the information, is routinely required as an incident of
government regulation of businesses such as banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a) (1)
(1976). We may be able to avoid telling secrets to friends, but we cannot avoid
writing or receiving checks. As one commentator has remarked:
The difference between the risk of faithlessness that we all run when we
choose our friends and the risk of faithlessness we run when government
foists a multiplying army of bribed informers on us may well be a matter
of degree; but of such degrees is liberty or its destruction engineered.
In any event, it is not betrayal against which the fourth amendment
protects us: it is the privacy of a free people living free lives.
Amsterdam, supra note 52, at 407.
101 For a discussion of governmental data sharing, see Miller, supra note 52,
at 1180-93. See note 109 infra.
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many agencies of the federal government have records about us,
we do know that the amount of information thus gathered is stag-
gering. In 1976, a report of the Senate Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights estimated that eighty-five federal agencies maintain
over 6700 record systems containing 3.8 billion records about indi-
vidual Americans. 0 2 In addition to information stored in govern-
mental memory banks, private industries and institutions other
than banks maintain billions more records. 03
At the present time, with both statutory and constitutional
impunity, members of the executive branch of the government can
delve into these data banks without our knowledge to acquire all
kinds of information about us, and we have no recourse. 04 Al-
1
0 2 
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTrTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE Coimm.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 17 (Comm.
Print 1976). See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (recognizing "the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal informa-
tion in computerized data banks or other massive government files"); Federal Data
Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971);
E. LONG, THE INTruDEss (1966); A. MTFrt, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVAcY (1971);
A. WESTIN & M. BAER, DATABANxS IN A FREE SociETY (1972) (report of the
Project on Computer Databanks of the Computer Science and Engineering Board,
National Academy of Sciences); WESTIN, supra note 52, at 298-326; Miller, supra
note 52, at 1129-40; Computerized Criminal Justice Information Systems: A Recog-
nition of Competing Interests, 22 VHrr.. L. lRv. 1171 (1977).
103 A study by the Office of Telecommunications of the Department of Com-
merce estimated that, in 1967, 46% of the gross national product, measured by the
value added method, originated in "information activity." M. PORAT, THE INFOR-
MATioN ECONOMY 8 (1977) (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Telecommunica-
tions, Special Pub. No. 77-12(1)). (Information activity is defined as "resources
consumed in producing, processing and distributing information goods and services,"
including both market and non-market transactions; information is defined as "data
that have been organized and communicated." Id. 2.) "Information workers"
accounted for 45% of the total work force and received 53% of total compensation.
Id. 8. In 1940, the number of industrial workers was twice that of information
workers; by 1967, the figures were reversed. See Miller, supra note 52, at 1140-54
(abuses of computerized credit information).
104 See Note, Informational Privacy: Constitutional Challenges to the Collection
and Dissemination of Personal Information by Government Agencies, 3 HAsTNcs
CONST. L.Q. 229 (1976). An agency's power to inspect records is not limited if
the custodian voluntarily complies with an informal request. Most agencies have
more forceful means at their disposal, although determining how many government
agencies have subpoena powers is practically impossible. Chief Judge Wright has
listed 47 agencies with power to subpoena telephone company billing records.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030, 1086 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
1431 (1979). Information furnished by the American Law Division of the Library
of Congress indicates that, as of December 22, 1977, 74 federal agencies had sub-
poena powers. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, created by section 5 of
the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1977), reviewed more than 160 separate
statutes empowering federal authorities to compel production of documents or
records and concluded that "[wihatever the nature of the summons power in a
particular case,.., it is uniformly given to administrative bodies who have enforce-
ment or oversight responsibilities-in other words, to virtually every agency of
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though we have no way of knowing the extent to which private
institutions voluntarily respond to informal requests for informa-
tion by government agents seeking evidence of wrongdoing or
simply satisfying their curiosity, we have good reason to believe
that these invisible intrusions are commonplace. At least a hint of
the extent to which government agencies acquire information from
these sources appears in the revelation by an American Airlines
computer expert that the airline permits ten to fifteen government
investigators a day to retrieve information from the airline's com-
puter about travelers' movements.10 5 The computer will obligingly
spew out flights traveled, seat numbers, telephone contacts, hotel
reservations, automobile reservations, and even fellow passengers.
Of course, the capability of an airline's computer to reveal private
information is miniscule compared with the snooping capacities of
such technological marvels as optical scanners, which can ingest
and return fantastic quantities of reading matter-06
B. The Mail
Even if we must assume that information that we knowingly
disclose to one department of government will be disclosed to
another without our knowledge, do we not have an expectation of
privacy in the transmission of letters through the mail? In 1877,
the answer was clear. The Supreme Court told us in Ex parte
Jackson:
Letters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to
their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by
government" PmvAcY PROTECTIoN STnmy CommsION, PERSONAL PRIvACY IN AN
INFORMATION SocTY 367 (1977).
The Omnibus Right to Privacy Act of 1977, H.R. 10076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), would establish a Federal Information Practices Board charged with over-
sight of government data collection practices. Title III of the bill requires a show-
ing of reasonable cause to believe that personal information about individuals is
material to a violation of federal law before it can be obtained by subpoena from
a third party. The bill further requires that the individual be given notice of these
subpoenas and an opportunity to object to release of the information. Individuals
would also be notified about the kinds of data federal agencies were collecting about
them and the intended uses of the information. The bill has been referred to
committee. 123 CoNG. REC. H12,316 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 1977).
105 Miller, supra note 52, at 1120. In 1977, the Bell Telephone system furnished
to federal agencies the billing records of 20,565 customers. Caine, Computers and
the Right to Be Let Alone--A Civil Libertarian View, 22 Viri.. L. BEv. 1181,
1183 (1977).
106 See Miller, supra note 52, at 1120-22. For a discussion, though somewhat
dated, of technological advances in surveillance techniques, see WEsTnv, supra note
52, at 65-89 (listening and watching devices), 158-68 (data surveillance).
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the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be
secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against in-
spection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they
can only be opened and examined under like warrant,
issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly de-
scribing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers
are subjected to search in one's own household. No law
of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected
with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of
letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regu-
lations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in
subordination to the great principle embodied in the
fourth amendment of the Constitution.
0 7
As of last year, Billy has no constitutional complaint if Javert
opened his letter-class mail from Laos. In United States v. Ram-
sey,108 the Supreme Court held that customs officials, acting entirely
on their own, can open such mail if they have reasonable cause to
suspect a violation of customs laws. 0 9 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speak-
ing for the majority, reasoned that we are no more entitled to expect
privacy with respect to letters that enter our country than we are to
expect that the contents of our suitcases will be free from customs
examination when we return from abroad.110 The majority of the
Court was unmoved by Mr. Justice Stevens' observation in dissent
that, "[i]f the government is allowed to exercise the power it claims,
the door will be open to the wholesale, secret examination of all
incoming international letter mail. No notice would be necessary
either before or after the search." "'
Do Billy and Hester have any better protection against the
institution of mail covers? The Supreme Court has not yet addressed
this issue, but the portent for privacy enthusiasts is not encouraging.
A mail cover is the process by which a record is made of any data
107 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
108 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
109 The customs officials were acting under the authority of 19 U.S.C. § 482
(1976). Cf. Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) (CIA's dis-
closure to FBI of information obtained by surreptitious opening of international
letter-class mail was beyond its authority and gave rise to state law cause of action
for invasion of privacy).
110 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977). For a history of the
Court's treatment of border searches, which have been held "reasonable" and not
subject to the warrant requirement, see id. 616-20.
M Id. 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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appearing on the outside cover of any class of mail in order to
obtain information about the addressee.112  An employee of any
state or federal law enforcement agency or governmental depart-
ment 113 may obtain a mail cover simply by asking the Postal Service
investigative division. Requests need not be supported by affidavits
or any supporting evidence." 4 The Postal Service has unfettered dis-
cretion to grant or to deny the request.'" Under existing federal
regulations, a request is honored initially for thirty days, but can
then be extended; 116 in one case, a mail cover was continued for
112 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c) (1) (1977). See generally The Matter of Wiretapping,
Electronic Eavesdropping, and Other Surveillance: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 325, 352-54 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on Surveillance]; Postal Inspection Service's Monitoring and Control of
Mail Surveillance and Cover Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal
Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management of the House Comm. on Post Office and
Civil Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Invasions of Privacy (Government
Agencies): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
113 Law enforcement agencies include any federal, state, or local unit "one of
whose functions is to investigate the commission or attempted commission of acts
constituting a crime." 39 C.F.R. § 2 33.2(c)(4) (1978). Requests for mail covers
have been honored from such entities as the Coast Guard, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, and the Departments of Interior, Labor, HEW, and Agriculture.
Hearings on Surveillance, supra note 112, at 334 (exhibit B).
11439 C.F.R. §233.2(d)(2)(ii) (1978). The request must specify "the rea-
sonable grounds that exist which demonstrate the mail cover is necessary to (A)
protect the national security, (B) locate a fugitive, or (C) obtain information re-
garding the commission or attempted commission of a [felony]," but the requesting
agency need not attest to the truth of these grounds or produce supporting evidence.
Id. "The regulations simply do not require the specification of the factual predi-
cate upon which the requesting agency bases its conclusion . . . .. United States
v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 172 (9th Cir.)., cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 350 (1978). The
court held there that the statement, "[ilt is felt that . . . Choate and the source
[of narcotics] correspond by mail,"' was sufficiently particular. Id. The district
court had been concerned that, "if an agency's mere 'feeling' that criminal activity
is afoot is sufficient to provide the needed showing, . . . [the reasonable grounds
requirement] will have been read out of existence." 422 F. Supp. 261, 266 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). The majority opinion dismissed this statement as a "hypertechnical
nicet[y]," 576 F.2d at 173, and did not address the issue of the intentional falsity
of the agent's representations.
115 The procedure is neither authorized nor controlled by any act of Congress.
No judicial officer is involved in any stage of the proceedings, and records are kept
by the Postal Service only. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 187, 190
(9th Cr.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 350 (1978) (Hufstedler, J., concurring & dis-
senting). Prior to 1965 amendments, these records were destroyed after two years.
Current regulations extend the period to eight years. 39 C.F.R. § 233.2 (g) (5)
(1978).
11639 C.F.R. §233.2(f)(4)-(5). The maximum period of extension is 120
days, unless a further extension is personally approved by the Chief Postal Inspec-
tor. Statistics prepared by the Postal Service for 1973 and 1974 reveal that most
domestic mail covers averaged 30 days while national security mail covers averaged
as many as 119.4 days. Hearings on Surveillance, supra note 112, at 332-35 (letter
of William J. Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector).
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ten years." 7 Although a mail cover does not permit a postal em-
ployee to open first-class mail,"" lesser classes of mail may be
opened." 9
When all of these data are compiled, a veritable treasure trove of
information unfolds before the curious eyes of the government. As
we learned from the history of Billy and Hester, significant clues are
provided to the identities and addresses of one's bank, creditors,
political parties, churches, friends, and relatives. 20  Also revealed
is one's taste in magazines, books, and other reading matter. Persons
whose mail is covered are not entitled to any notice.' 2 ' The whole
process is therefore completely invisible to the scrutinee unless he
stumbles on it by accident or by a lucky discovery motion if the
investigation turns up incriminating evidence.122
Lower courts have rarely perceived that any interest protected
by the fourth amendment is implicated by mail covers. 123 In part,
317 United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501, 507-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 822 (1976).
118 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(f) (1) (1978).
119 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(c) (1) (1978).
120 The only correspondent exempted from a mail cover is the subject's "known
attorney-at-law." 39 C.F.R. § 233.2(f).(2) (1978). Once the identities of cor-
respondents are known, the investigating agency can discover further information
about the subject from the correspondents' ifies, for example, bank accounts and
credit information. Furthermore, mail covers often lead to investigations of the
correspondents themselves, as was the case with Billy's Aunt Hester. E.g., United
States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976) (150 persons who received mail from Switzerland without a return ad-
dress were investigated by IRS for possible income tax evasion); Paton v. La Prade,
524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (FBI investigated everyone who wrote to Socialist
Workers Party); see Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967),
and United States v. Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 942 (1961) (Post Office contacted all correspondents with mail fraud suspects
to see if they had been defrauded).
12139 C.F.R. § 233.2 (1978).
122 See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972).
39 C.F.R. §233.2(g)(4) (1978) provides: "Any data concerning mail covers
shall be made available to any mail cover subject in any legal proceeding through
appropriate discovery procedures." The regulations do not, however, appear to
permit discovery by senders of information gathered through a mail cover of the
recipient.
In United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
350 (1978), although incriminating evidence was discovered through a mail cover,
the existence of the mail cover was not disclosed in response to a pretrial discovery
motion. The mail cover was revealed inadvertently almost two years later at a sup-
pression hearing when the investigating agent spontaneously disclosed the mail cover
in an attempt to show that the cover, and not prior illegal searches, was the source
of most of his leads. Id. 187 n.14 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
123 United States v. Merz, 580 F.2d 342, 345 (8th Cir. 1978); Lustiger v.
United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 1966); United States
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this is due to recurring attacks of Olmsteadism: no trespass is in-
volved, no search or seizure occurs when the eye registers the im-
pressions from the outside of an envelope or the hand records the
information. The fact that the object of the mail cover is to create
a data bank has almost entirely escaped judicial attention, and, for
that reason, courts have not applied the Katz v. United States124
expectation of privacy concept to mail covers. Equally rare is rec-
ognition that "the mails [are] almost as much a part of free speech
as the right to use our tongues" 125 and that other first amendment
values permeate this subject as well. For example, the use of a
mail cover to obtain the membership lists of the Abigail Adams
Liberation Front, the Tory party, or the NAACP may be somewhat
more awkward than a court order to produce the lists, but it is every
bit as effective. 26
At this time the Supreme Court's views on mail covers are not
known. If the Court adopts the rationale of Miller v. United
States 2 to resolve the problem, fourth amendment protection will
be nonexistent. 28 On the other hand, if the Court characterizes
the questions as implicating first amendment values129 as well as
constitutionally protected rights of privacy, the Court may also
perceive that the collection of personal data by a mail cover is also
v. Schwartz, 283 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 942 (1961);
United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
937 (1958); United States v. Isaacs, 347 F. Supp. 743, 750 (N.D. IM. 1972), aff'd
on other grounds, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
124389 U.S. 347 (1967).
125 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Bur-
leson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
126 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). In a civil suit brought
by a 16-year-old student who became the subject of a full-scale FBI investigation
after she wrote to the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP) as part of a high school
civics assignment, national security mail covers were held unconstitutional under the
first amendment. Paton v. La Prade, No. 1091-73 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 1978). The
FBI considered the party a subversive organization and conducted investigations of
all SWP correspondence, including that of the plaintiff, to identify new members,
sympathizers, financial contributors, and employees. The district court found that
the regulation permitting national security mail covers was invalid on its face be-
cause "an investigation can be initiated on the assertions of an over-zealous public
ofcial who disagrees with the unorthodox, yet constitutionally protected political
views of a group or person." Id., slip op. at 17-18.
127425 U.S. 435 (1976).
128 See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 175-76 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 350 (1978). For a criticism of the application of the analysis of Miller
v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), to mail covers, see Choate, 576 F.2d at 204-
05 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting).
229 See Paton v. La Prade, No. 1091-73 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 1978) (first, but
not fourth, amendment rights violated by national security mail covers), discussed
in note 126 supra. But see United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 180-81 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 350 (1978) (rejecting first amendment argument).
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a violation of the liberty interests protected by the fourth amend-
ment under Katz.
C. Electronic Surveillance
Although privacy rooters do not have much to cheer about in
the constitutional protection accorded to users of the mails, should
they not join the round of applause for the protection that Katz v.
United States 130 gave us from invisible electronic searches for in-
tangible things? Alas, no. Katz assures us that, without a warrant,
law enforcement agents cannot plant a bug outside a public tele-
phone booth to listen to Billy's conversation with his aunt. But the
fourth amendment supplies no protection to Billy in the same phone
booth if the recording device is in Hester's hand during the con-
versation. The presence of an unknown governmental ear at the
other end of the telephone line, rather than on the outside of the
telephone booth, makes all the constitutional difference, even though
the effect of the invisible eavesdropping is identical as far as Billy
is concerned. Capturing Billy's conversation by electronic means
in the hands of Hester is no intrusion at all even if the entire per-
formance is for the government's benefit.' 31
If Billy chooses his friends and relatives carefully, doesn't Katz
assure him that he will not be the victim of electronic surveillance
without the protections of a warrant? All that we can tell Billy
today is, if you will excuse the expression, "don't bank on it." The
Supreme Court has not yet squarely confronted the question whether
the electronic surveillance procedure authorized by the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 132 is adequate to meet fourth
amendment standards. Despite its name, the Act has nothing to
do with safe streets and has only a collateral effect upon crime con-
trol. 13 The Act is an effort to control electronic bugging and
eavesdropping by private persons, but it purports to give very broad
powers to federal and state law enforcement officers to undertake
such surveillance techniques. Under the procedures of the Act, a
federal court order to bug or to wiretap can be obtained, following
authorization by the United States Attorney General or his designee,
130389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See Kitch,
Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. Rav.
133; Long, The Right to Privacy: The Case Against the Government, 10 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 1 (1965); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 53.
132 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
133 See text following note 154 infra.
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upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the person to be
surveilled has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime and
that other methods of gathering evidence have not been successful. 184
All this has a very familiar ring. The question is whether the sound
is the chime of a fourth amendment warrant or the knell of a gen-
eral warrant or writ of assistance.
18 5
Electronic bugging and wiretapping is always indiscriminate
despite some spattering of specifics in authorization orders. The
order specifies the telephone to be tapped or the home or office
to be bugged. 8 6 But, unless the person subjected to scrutiny is
addicted to soliloquy and telephonic monologues, conversations of
others unknown in advance will be captured as well. Recording
can be selective, but interception cannot. The choice is necessarily
left to the interceptor, and not to the court. The thing to be
seized can never be specifically described because the evidence
sought is not in existence when the order is issued. Moreover, the
court's function is not that of a neutral magistrate undertaking
a preliminary step in an adjudicative process, but rather that of
an adjunct of the executive branch. The court acts as the sovereign's
messenger, not the impartial arbiter, because the target of the in-
terception has no notice of the execution of the order and no
opportunity to challenge it. The "return" is merely a report of
the progress of the investigation; 1.7 an incorporeal product can no
more be redelivered to the persons from whom it was taken than
smoke can be restored to a flaming log. The effectiveness of elec-
tronic surveillance depends upon the invisibility of the entire
process and the lack of notice to the persons affected. 8
134 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3) (1976).
335 See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353 (1966) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Taylor, supra note 6, at 71-91.
.136 18 U.S.C. §2518(4) (1976).
187 The court order authorizing an interception "may require reports to be made
to the judge who issued the order showing what progress has been made toward
achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception."
18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1976). In addition, the contents of intercepted communica-
tions "shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable de-
vice .... Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, ... such
recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under
his directions." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (a) (1976).
188 Wiretapping is not the only method of gleaning information from telephone
monitoring. Use of a pen register permits the recording of all numbers dialed from
a person's telephone. Information obtained by a pen register is closely analogous
to that obtained by a mail cover. The Supreme Court held recently that fourth
amendment protections do not extend to the use of pen registers. Smith v. Mary-
land, 47 U.S.L.W. 4779 (U.S. June 20, 1979) (No. 78-5374). The majority, noting
that the defendant's property itself was not invaded and that pen registers have
only limited surveillance capabilities, id. 4780, held that persons have no reasonable
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The synergistic effect of the multiple erosions of Boyd v. United
States'139 should now be evident. These electronic intrusions are
aimed precisely at gathering "mere evidence" for the purpose of
incriminating the object of the surveillance, preferably from the
scrutinee's own mouth. The fifth amendment compulsion formerly
found in fourth amendment searches is gone. Persons surveilled
"voluntarily" bare thoughts not only to their families and closest
friends, but to governmental ears, mechanically activated, with or
without attachment to the government's cybernetic mind. Intru-
sions of the mail, whether examination of the exterior by a human
eye or by an optical scanner or examination of the contents by
hand or by mechanical means which sidestep the nuisance of slit-
ting envelopes, are also collections of mere evidence.
D. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
This combination of ingredients was the background of the
Supreme Court's decision last term of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 40
During a student demonstration on the Stanford campus, some
demonstrators and nine policemen were injured. The student
newspaper covered the story and published photographs of the in-
cident. The local district attorney obtained a search warrant for
an immediate search of the newspaper's offices and files for nega-
tives, film, and pictures which could possibly lead to the identifica-
tion of persons who assaulted the peace officers. The newspaper's
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper
baskets were searched, 141 but the search uncovered no evidence.
The lower courts held that the warranted search was unreason-
able because the newspaper was completely innocent, and because
the government had made no showing that a less intrusive means,
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. Id. 4781. The majority
relied on the rationale of Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and held
that the telephone company's ability to record numbers dialed is common knowledge
so that individuals using the telephone assume the risk that this information will
be turned over to the government. Id. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall,
in dissent, argued that persons are entitled to an expectation of privacy regarding
the telephone numbers they dial. Id. 4782 (Stewart, J., dissenting); 4782-83
(Marshall, J., dissenting). justices Marshall and Brennan criticized also the ma-
jority's assumption of risk theory. According to that analysis, they predicted, the
government could define the scope of fourth amendment protections "simply by
announcing their intent to monitor the content of random samples of first class mail
or private phone conversations," thereby "put[ting] the public on notice of the
risks they would thereafter assume in such communications." Id. 4783 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
239 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
140 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
141 ld. 551.
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such as a subpoena, would not have been as effective.142  The Su-
preme Court reversed, upholding the search against both fourth and
first amendment attacks. Not only is an innocent person subject to
a warranted search for evidence incriminating someone else, but
also "a less stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable where
the entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the possessor." 143
In other words, an innocent person has less fourth amendment pro-
tection than a crook who keeps incriminating evidence to himself.
The innocent person who objects to the search has no remedy at
all.144 If anything incriminating is discovered, the person incrimi-
nated may not have standing to complain even if the warrant is
defective. 145  The majority of the Court was unmoved by Mr.
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion which pointed out that
[c]ountless law-abiding citizens-doctors, lawyers, mer-
chants, customers, bystanders-may have documents in their
possession that relate to an ongoing criminal investigation.
The consequences of subjecting this large category of per-
sons to unannounced police searches are extremely serious.
The ex parte warrant procedure enables the prosecutor to
obtain access to privileged documents that could not be
examined if advance notice gave the custodian an oppor-
tunity to object.140
Mr. Justice Stevens questioned whether the benefits to law enforce-
ment efforts outweighed the offensive intrusions upon the privacy
of law-abiding citizens.147
142 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1977).
3
43 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978).
144 The Court regarded the innocent person's inability to challenge the search
as of no consequence: "We reject totally the reasoning of the District Court that
additional protections are required to assure that the Fourth Amendment rights of
third parties are not violated because of the unavailability of the exclusionary rule
as a deterrent to improper searches of premises in the control of nonsuspects." Id.
562-63 n.9. See also Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HAIv. L. BEy. 1532 (1972) (inadequacy of civil remedies for consti-
tutional torts).
145 See Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), discussed at note 90 supra.
146 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 579 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted). Police searched the Stanford Daily's photographic labora-
tories, filing cabinets, desks, and wastebaskets. A prior adversary hearing would
have given the newspaper "an opportunity to demonstrate to the court what the
police ultimately found to be true-that the evidence sought did not exist." Id. 576
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
'47Id. 581-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393 (1978) (citations omitted):
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investiga-
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VII. How DiD WE GET HERE, AND WHAT Do
WE Do Now?
Beneath the surface of the opinions from Boyd v. United
States148 to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 149 are value judgments,
rarely articulated, about the appropriate relationships between the
state and the individual and about the role of law, particularly
constitutional law, in maintaining an acceptable balance between
private rights and public good. In Stanford Daily, the Justices'
value judgments are very nearly explicit. 5 0 The majority, speak-
ing through Mr. Justice White, believes that, as long as some pro-
cedural niceties are followed, public interest in enforcing criminal
laws outweighs societal interests in preserving individual privacy
and at least some of the values protected by the first amendment.' 51
The dissenting Justices do not accept that evaluation on first
amendment grounds or fourth amendment grounds or both.
Stanford Daily puts the question rather starkly: How much
freedom are we willing to trade for "security" against crime? How
much "protection" from- whom have we bought and at what
price? Unfortunately, in our national hysteria about crime, we
tion of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But
the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be to-
tally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the
criminal law.
.48 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
149 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
150 See, e.g., 436 U.S. 547, 561-62, n.8 (1978) (use of subpoena unlikely to
"result in the production of evidence with sufficient regularity to satisfy the public
interest in law enforcement" because recipient of a subpoena, "[unlike the individ-
ual whose privacy is invaded by a search, . . . may assert the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination"). See Chase, The Burger Court, The Individ-
ual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv.
518 (1977).
' 5' This view is also the source of hostility toward the exclusionary rule. Pro-
fessor Kaplan observes, "[ilt is possible that the real problem with the exclusionary
rule is that it flaunts before us the price we pay for the Fourth Amendment." J.
KAPLAN, CwmIAL JUsnicE 216 (2d ed. 1978). The large number of convictions
lost on motions to suppress indicates a high degree of disregard for the prohibition
of unreasonable searches. As Professor Kamisar has pointed out, the outraged reac-
tion of many law enforcement officials to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
indicates that prior to Mapp the police customarily ignored the substantive com-
mands of the fourth amendment. Mapp, of course, worked no change in the sub-
stantive reach of the fourth amendment: it pertained only to the evidentiary use
of illegally seized evidence. See Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical"
or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuncA uru 66, 70,
71 (1978). The problem is not that the exclusionary rule doesn't "work," that is,
doesn't deter illegal searches, but that critics believe that catching criminals is more
important than preserving freedom from unreasonable searches-as long as the tar-
get is someone other than the critic.
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have not compared very closely how much we are paying with how
little we are receiving in return. The benefits of the bargain can-
not sensibly be examined without identifying the different kinds of
interests that we have in eradicating different kinds of crime.
For example, the societal interests in controlling securities frauds
are very different from the societal interests in preventing muggings.
Moreover, the means used both to prevent and to detect white collar
crime, like securities fraud, are obviously very different from those
used in fighting street crime, like mugging. Mail covers, electronic
surveillance, and examination of bank records may have some utility
in capturing white collar crooks, but are virtually useless in con-
trolling street crime.
The level of public anxiety is extremely high when the subject
is street crime, crimes against the person and against property within
the home. On the other hand, the level of concern about white
collar crime is low, almost to the point of indifference, even though
the dollar losses from muggers, burglars, robbers, and other kinds of
so-called "real criminals" are insignificant in comparison to the
billions of dollars that white collar criminals "rip off." 152 The dif-
ference in our responses to the two kinds of crime is by no means
irrational. We have perfectly sound reasons for fearing crimes that
threaten us with personal violence or with intrusions into our living
space, while we can view impersonal white collar crimes with
equanimity. No one is afraid to walk by the offices of Equity Fund-
ing, even at night. 53
The sales pitch for electronic surveillance is evidenced by con-
gressional use of the title "Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act." 154 The implication is that when we have yielded our freedom
from electronic intrusion we have bought safety in the streets. A
few moments' reflection will convince you that the assumption is
nonsense. Electronic surveillance, wiretapping, and data bank
gathering are effective in crime control only in areas in which some
kind of communication is an indispensable ingredient of the crime
itself or at least a highly useful adjunct to criminal activity. Crimes
of this type are certain kinds of white collar crimes, narcotics traf-
152 United States Chamber of Commerce, White Collar Crime: The Problem
and its Import, in 1 Cnvm AN JusnrcE 314-55 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang
eds. 2d ed. 1971). "The yearly cost of embezzlement and pilferage reportedly ex-
ceeds by several billion dollars the losses sustained throughout the nation from
burglary and robbery." Id. 315.
15 3 See C. SImB AN, CQmnAL VIoLENcE, Canmmrx JusncE (1978). Sil-
berman's penetrating discussion of the sources and solutions of the problem of vio-
lent crime is accompanied by an exhaustive bibliography.
154 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
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ficking, gambling, seditious libel, and conspiracies to commit those
offenses. The ultimate question is this: does our societal interest
in possibly preventing or detecting the commission of such crimes
outweigh the societal interest in being free from incorporeal intru-
sions into our offices, homes, and private lives? We cannot evaluate
the price of the trade-off without some idea of the effectiveness of
these intrusions in preventing those crimes or in revealing the
offenders. Nor can we decide how much we have paid for this pro-
tection unless we also know how many innocent people we have
hurt in the process. If we knew, for example, that for every heroin
dealer we caught by electronic surveillance, one hundred Billy Budds
suffered injury, would we say that we had made a good societal bar-
gain?
The truth is that we have no idea about the effectiveness of
these insidious intrusions in controlling the few crimes to which the
techniques can conceivably be relevant. We have the illusion that
electronic surveillance is effective because the only cases we ever
see are those in which some kind of incriminating evidence is ulti-
mately produced. The innocent victims, like Hester and Billy, may
never find out that the causes of their distress were invisible searches
and, even if they later learn the cause, no redress is available.
When a tangible interest is weighed against a tangible interest,
the scale is relatively easy to read. When the interests on both sides
of the scale are not only intangible, but often invisible, however,
the weighing process is a very chancy affair. How many grams of
societal interest in the privacy of our mail does it take to outweigh
the societal interest in using the mails to try to find and to convict
a securities swindler? Does public anxiety about narcotics traffick-
ing outweigh the public interest in untapped telephones?
The answers to questions like these are always easy if one as-
sumes that the liberty given up belongs to someone else. For in-
stance, a brief flurry of congressional interest in mail covers occurred
after reports that some Senators and Congressmen had been sub-
jected to mail covers.155 Until then, members of Congress, like
members of the general public, shared the happy assumption that
none of these governmental intrusions would ever be turned against
them. Myths, like that one, have endured because they are so com-
fortable. Is it not soothing to believe that crime control is simply
a matter of hiring enough policemen and giving them enough hard-
ware to deal with the situation? Would it not be unsettling to
155 See Note, Invasion of Pivacy: Use and Abuse of Mail Covers, 4 COLum.
J.L. & Soc. PoB. 165, 166 (1968).
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realize that control of street crime depends primarily upon exter-
minating racism and employing adolescents gainfully rather than re-
moving soft-headed judges who apply exclusionary rules?
From the mass of publicity about our crime problems, one
might think that the nation consists of millions of innocent victims
held hostage by an alien band of criminals. Such observations con-
tain a bacterium of truth if they are confined to the mindless and
often savage attacks by young, disorganized thugs. But the percep-
tion is wildly off the mark with respect to such crimes as gambling,
dealing in stolen property, prostitution, loan sharking, and all kinds
of predatory economic crime. Organized crime and professional
criminals could not make their indecent livings by selling their wares
to one another. The fact is that the patrons of pornographic arts,
of prostitutes, of fences, and of all kinds of gambling and vice are
members of the so-called straight society. 156 The crooks who pander
to our vices, who profit from our searches for goods and services at
prices too good to be true, and who otherwise appeal to our baser
instincts, may be our number one public enemies, but we have
found public enemy number two, and the enemy is us.
If we are to make any progress in protecting ourselves from
further diminution of our own liberties, we must shed our reliance
upon mythology. We must acknowledge that we do not know very
much about behavior modification. We must be aware that there
is no simple solution to the "crime problem" because crime is not a
single "disease" affecting only a few of our citizens; it is a complex,
pandemic phenomenon. Efforts to eradicate crime by yielding more
and more of our freedom to the government are exercises in futility.
We cannot sit back doing nothing and awaiting enlightenment,
nor can we be idle while anticipating the reincarnations of Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Bradley to deliver us from our follies. The
encroachments on rights protected by the fourth and fifth amend-
ments have taken a century, and revaluation of these rights by the
Supreme Court will be a long and arduous process. Meanwhile,
we have judicial systems and legislatures in fifty states, as well as a
national legislature, which can begin the restoration task.
157
15 6 See SmBmmAN, supra note 153, at 99-111.
157 Several bills dealing with the right of privacy have been introduced in Con-
gress: S. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 83791 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1979)
(proposed by President Carter to limit the effect of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978), with respect to "persons involved in First Amendment activities");
H.R. 10076, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Bxc. H12,316 (daily ed. Nov. 11,
1977); H.R. 8279, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. Eec. 117070 (daily ed. July
13, 1977), and H.RL 1347, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc. H216 (daily ed.
Jan. 6, 1977).
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The first step is to recognize that we must have zones of indi-
vidual privacy which cannot be penetrated by the government, be-
cause no societal interest can be as compelling as the need of the
individual citizen for preservation of autonomy of personality. 58
One of those zones of privacy protects one's home from any in-
visible governmental presence. 159 This protection is not an inven-
tion of Anglo-American jurisprudence. For thousands of years, the
home has been protected from intrusions because enclaves of privacy
are essential to fill some of our most basic human needs.10 Physical
158 [P]rivacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some
other value, but . . . it is necessarily related to ends and relations of
the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is
not merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations;
rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable.
Fried, supra note 52, at 477. See WEsa-n, supra note 52, at 23-25, 32-39, 42-
51 (functions of individual and organizational privacy); Greenawalt, The Consent
Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent
of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 189 (1968); Note, A Re-
consideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, supra note 52, at 156 (fourth
amendment "protects the right to have certain expectations of privacy," regardless of
governmental manipulation of actual expectations of privacy). See also Levi, Confi-
dentiality and Democratic Government, 30 RIc. A.B. CrTy N.Y. 323 (1975) (gov-
erment's need for "privacy"). Westin suggests that
personal information, thought of as the right of decision over one's pri-
vate personality, should be defined as a property right, with all the re-
straints on interference by public or private authorities and due-process
guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful in devising. Along
with this concept should go the idea that circulation of personal informa-
tion by someone other than the owner or his trusted agent is handling a
dangerous commodity in interstate commerce, and creates special duties
and liabilities on the information utility or government system handling it.
WEsTn,, supra, at 324-25.
159 "The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a
long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citations omitted). Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), should not be read to diminish this right. That case re-
jected the notion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that the
fourth amendment was not violated unless a trespass occurred. The purpose of
Katz was to expand, not to contract, protection from searches and seizures. Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (fourth amendment violation to enter
person's home to install wiretap even though none of his conversations were re-
corded; Katz not intended to withdraw any fourth amendment protection of the
home). See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, supra
note 52; Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 53.
160 See LAssoN, supra note 6, at 14-19.
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can
retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get
at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk
of liberty-worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized
society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny,
some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a
man's castle.
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entry has been permitted for limited purposes if the government
meets stringent procedural requirements. Invisible government
presence in our homes is, however, unacceptable and should be
flatly prohibited.
Procedural protections to control physical entrance into the
home are useless as shields from an intangible presence. A knock
on the door never announces an incoming bug, a hyperbolic micro-
phone, or a laser beam. A microphone concealed on a visitor does
not beep its presence, announce its mission, or seek our invitation.
The fact of an incorporeal presence in our homes is diabolical no
matter how that presence made its entry nor which mechanical con-
trivance was the means.""l The fear of that presence is just as
sinister. We do not need a sophisticated study or a carefully cali-
brated scale to tell us that acceptance of invisible searches of our
homes is too high a price for the innocent to pay to seek out the
guilty. A common burglar is bad enough, but an invisible govern-
mental burglar is intolerable.
We should promptly enact statutes restricting governmental
intrusion into our mail to searches undertaken pursuant to a war-
rant. Whether the mail originates from across the sea or from
across town, governmental eyes should not be permitted to read
the contents of our letters, absent strongest justification. We have
no reason for confidence in the speed with which our mail will be
delivered, but we should have the assurance that the journey of our
letters, no matter how slow, will not be interrupted by govern-
mental spying. Mailmen should be our messengers, not the state's
newsgatherers. 1 2 Whether the ideas we send through the mail are
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 n.4 (1961) (quoting United States
v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, I., dissenting), aff'd,
343 U.S. 747 (1952)). See note 52 supra.
161 Technologically assisted visual surveillance is at least equally intrusive as
electronic eavesdropping, but courts have been less willing to find it unreasonable.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy because
defendant could have drawn blinds, though agent had to climb ladder and use
binoculars to see into window). But see United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252
(D. Hawaii 1976) (use of high powered telescope from distance of one-quarter
mile to see into apartment was unreasonable search; use of binoculars from 160 feet
to observe outside terrace was permissible); People v. Arno, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624
(Ct. App. 1979) (use of binoculars and telescopes to enhance vision of something
visible with naked eye not a per se violation of federal or state constitution, though
use to enable sight of something not so visible unconstitutionally invades reasonable
expectation of privacy). See Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 261 (1976);
Comment, Telescopic Surveillance as a Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 63
IowA L. IEv. 708 (1978).
16 2 See Co~aassioN oN CIA AcTrvrrEs WrrimN Tm Umn STATES, REPORT
TO =E PESmiENT (1975); SmATE SELECT Comm. TO STUDY CovEnNm=AL Op-
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as lofty as biblical exegesis, as essential for democratic process as
political debate, or as trivial as gossip, communication of those
ideas free from unreasonable governmental intrusion is an essential
value in a free society. Societal interests in discovering criminal
acts and in identifying criminals through warrantless searches of the
mail are not great enough to justify sacrificing the privacy of our
mail. Monitoring our mail for the purpose of creating data banks,
as well as opening our letters in search of incriminating evidence,
should be forbidden by statute, in the absence of a real warrant
issued upon old-fashioned probable cause to believe that specific
mail contains evidence of an identified crime committed by the
sender or the receiver. A warrant requirement would also permit
both addressees and senders a genuine opportunity to challenge the
validity of the intrusion.
Statutory repairs should be undertaken promptly to protect
innocent persons from corporeal or incorporeal searches to discover
evidence implicating others in criminal activity. Governmental
searches are extremely unpleasant, whether they are conducted pur-
suant to a warrant or without such procedural amenities. Inno-
cent persons should not be subjected to the pain and indignity of
a search unless the invasion is justified by a compelling need which
cannot reasonably be satisfied by less intrusive methods. Warrant-
less searches are unreasonable per se. No warrants should issue to
search an innocent person's home or office absent a showing, sup-
ported by affidavit, that the particularly described evidence in-
criminating another would be lost or destroyed if the government
were required to proceed by way of a summons or subpoena.
Whether the subject of a third-party search is the Ben Franldin
Free Press Association or plain old Ben, the third-party search con-
founds the innocent with the guilty and suffers from many of the
infirmities that caused our colonial forebears to take up arms against
writs of assistance and general warrants.
Governmental and private peeping toms and eavesdroppers will
not vanish by passing laws against such conduct. But the law it-
self will no longer be tarnished by approving this "dirty busi-
ness." 163 Excluding the fruits of such illegal conduct will relieve
the judiciary of continuing to play an ignoble role.
History is a great teacher, but we are not always apt pupils.
"In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conffict or
ERATIONS w RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcnvTrvEs, INTELLIGENCE AcTnivTEs
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMEICANS (1976) (final report).
163 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
GOVERNMENTAL INFORMATION GATHERING
fear of internal subversion," 164 those who feel the most threatened,
whether they are crowned heads or ordinary people, have always
wanted to turn the forces of the state against those who are seen as
enemies, no matter how sorely freedoms are trampled. Protecting
those whom we despise from arbitrary intrusions by officialdom
appears unrealistic or even extravagant. The bitter lesson of his-
tory, though, is that each time we diminish the freedom of our
neighbor, even a wicked neighbor, we likewise diminsh our own.
In times not altogether unlike our own... [the authors of
our fundamental constitutional concepts] won . . . a right
of personal security against arbitrary intrusions by official
power. If times have changed, reducing everyman's scope
to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world, the
changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amend-
ment more, not less, important. 65
In a harshly materialistic world, intangible values assume even
greater significance. Without the fuel for the spirit supplied by
intangible values, no energy exists to pursue happiness or to carry
on the never-ending search for justice. The price to be paid for
freedom must always be extravagant because it is a rare and precious
jewel in our treasury of intangible things.
164 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
165 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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